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SCOTT SUNDBY, A LIFE AND DEATH DECISION: A JURY WEIGHS THE DEATH
PENALTY (Palgrave Macmillan 2005).
Let's start with the bottom line: Professor Scott Sundby has published a
fascinating account of jury deliberations in death penalty cases. A Life and Death
Decision: A Jury Weighs the Death Penalty, which I will refer to as Life and Death
hereafter, provides raw data about the intersection between juries and the death
penalty, in the jurors' own words. It is also filled with interesting facts, useful
information, and humor. It presents a morbid and, to some, forbidding topic-who
wants to read about the death penalty on their day off?-with wit and elegance.
And at only 187 text pages, it is easily readable over a weekend or on a longish
plane flight. Finally, the book is quite accessible and not just, or even primarily,
for lawyers. Yet it is also replete with information that is valuable and interesting
to lawyers familiar with death penalty law. Professor Sundby never "dumbs
down" the topic, but instead presents this complex legal area with a seamless,
smooth style.
One of the nicest points is that Life and Death presents new information for
the capital punishment debate, rather than rehashing the old-no mean
achievement in the never-ending American controversy over capital punishment.
Professor Sundby presents verbatim accounts from actual capital case jurors,
discussing how they arrived at their decisions. There simply aren't any other
contemporary books out there that present real capital jury deliberations in the
jurors' own words.'
* Professor of Law, Hastings College of the Law (U.C.). Thanks to Sharif Jacob, Hastings
Class of 2007, for enthusiastic and stimulating research assistance.
I Hearing about jury deliberations after the fact in the jurors' own words is as close to
hearing the actual deliberations as American law and culture currently permits. Fifty years ago, in
the most extensive empirical study of juries at the time, researchers in 1955 taped the live
deliberations of five real criminal juries in Wichita, Kansas. See HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL,
THE AMERICAN JURY xiv-xv (1971). The result was "public censure by the Attorney General of the
United States, a special hearing before ... the Senate Judiciary Committee, [and] the enactment of
statutes in some thirty-odd jurisdictions prohibiting jury-tapping." Id. at xv. Thus
contemporaneously capturing American capital jury deliberations is not currently a viable option.
See generally 18 U.S.C. § 1508 (2000) (prohibiting taping of jury deliberations); Janet C. Hoeffel,
Risking the Eighth Amendment: Arbitrariness, Juries, and Discretion in Capital Cases, 46 B.C. L.
REv. 771 (2005) (arguing against jury secrecy); Abrahm Abramovsky & Jonathan I. Edelstein,
Cameras in the Jury Room: An Unnecessary and Dangerous Precedent, 28 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 865 (1996)
(arguing for jury secrecy).
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I will confess something at the outset, something that many law professors, I
suspect, guiltily understand: I don't really read a lot of law books or law review
articles (or law book reviews) in my spare time. Life is full, teaching is fun but
time-consuming if done well, and relaxation is often found in other genres or
venues. So it is with the enthusiasm of the reluctant but well-satisfied legal reader
that I recommend Scott Sundby's book. Life and Death is a good read for non-
lawyers, and also for lawyers who want to read about the death penalty
novelistically, rather than in dense legal jargon. For law professors, it seems a
perfect companion book to assign in a capital punishment seminar, or any class
that studies trial by jury (Criminal Procedure? Trial advocacy?). Indeed, I would
recommend the book for undergraduate courses as well. Finally, the book is not
limited to the death penalty context. It is more broadly a study of jury dynamics.
Whether you seek to understand how juries think and act, or you want to influence
them, or you just want a unique window into jury deliberations, Life and Death is
an invaluable guide.
So my bottom line: Get this slim volume and read it quickly, all the way
through. It will not only inform you, but will also entertain.
I. JURIES AND THE DEATH PENALTY: UNRESOLVED (UNRESOLVABLE?)
RELATIONSHIPS
A. Juries and Capital Punishment: Similar Conflicting Emotions
Americans have long had a love-hate relationship with the death penalty.
Critical of its harshness and unforgiving character, and recently distrustful of its
accuracy, 2 a super-majority of Americans still supports its administration to "high-
end" murderers whose guilt is unquestioned.3 While calls for moratoria on the
death penalty currently abound,4 capital punishment has been part of the American
justice system since the Framers enacted federal death penalties as part of the First
Crime Bill in 1790.5 And but for a brief procedural hiatus in the 1970s,6 the death
penalty has never been absent from the American legal landscape.
2 See BARRY SCHECK ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE (2000). 1 present Actual Innocence to my
students as the most influential, in terms of actually changing legal institutions and fundamental
perceptions, legal book of the Twentieth Century.
3 See Rory K. Little, The Federal Death Penalty: History and Some Thoughts About the
Department of Justice's Role, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 347 (1999) [hereinafter Little, History]
(collecting authorities growing out of Professor David Baldus's pathbreaking findings to this effect).
Similarly, one of the many interesting facts that Professor Sundby provides even for death penalty
scholars is that "most [capital] jurors stated that they still supported the death penalty after seeing the
process at work." (Sundby, at 165.)
4 See Rory K. Little, Why a Federal Death Penalty Moratorium?, 33 CONN. L. REV. 791
(2001) [hereinafter Little, Moratorium].
5 Little, History, supra note 3, at 360-65.
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Not dissimilarly, Americans have long had a love-hate relationship with the
jury system. Critical of its uncertainty and inherently arbitrary character, and
distrustful of its accuracy, Americans nevertheless venerate the concept of jury
trials. Justice Scalia has metaphorically described the right to jury trial as "the
spinal column of American democracy" because it is the only such right to appear
in the body of the Constitution and also the Bill of Rights.7 While calls for "jury
reform" are never absent, the criminal jury trial right was plainly fundamental to
the Framers (many of whom had committed treason, one of the most serious
crimes known to governments, and suffered British judge trials). Not only has the
criminal jury trial right been recognized as "fundamental to the American system
of justice" and thereby part of the due process that all states must provide,8 but it
recently has been transformed through a bit of constitutional alchemy to apply not
only to guilt or innocence, but also to important sentencing facts.
9
Given these schizophrenic views, pulling in opposite directions on both
topics, it is unsurprising that when the death penalty and jury trial concepts are
combined, highly controversial views result. Some of our most raw and
unresolved legal emotions are exposed when we study criminal juries that decide
whether or not to impose a penalty of death.
B. Professor Sundby's Snapshot
Professor Sundby's concise (187 text pages) and elegant volume provides a
gripping, readable account of how the members of one capital jury arrived at their
decision to impose death. In a captivating, almost novelistic narrative, the book
primarily presents the jurors' own words and voices, recounting their views of the
murder case they decided (People v. Lane-although all names have been changed
for privacy reasons (Sundby, at xiv)), and how they arrived at a death verdict after
four days of deliberation. Although the jury's verdict was ultimately unanimous,
one chapter details the thoughts and deliberative process of a "holdout" juror, a
young woman who refused to vote for death until the last day, and later said she
regretted her vote.
Once the primary presentation of the Lane jury's deliberations is complete
(Sundby, at 1-131), Life and Death then briefly compares Lane to another murder
case (People v. Brown), where the offense facts were undoubtedly more egregious
than Lane's, yet the jury agreed on a life sentence. It is at this point that the book
leaves pure description behind, and enters normatively (if subtly) into the death
6 From 1972 when Furman was decided, until 1976 when the Gregg opinions were issued,
upholding state death penalty statutes enacted in response to Furman. See Furman v. Georgia, 408
U.S. 238 (1972); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
7 Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 30 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
8 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).
9 See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296
(2004).
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penalty debate. Although Professor Sundby "tried... to keep [his] personal views
about capital punishment out of the telling of the jurors' stories" (Sundby, at xiii)
an obvious, if unspoken, point of the book is a claim that the two jury verdicts are
inconsistent: death is given to the panic-shooting killer of a convenience store clerk
(Lane), while life is given to the horrible torture-murderer of two young victims
(Brown). The implicit conclusion seems clear, unspoken but not unapparent: we
should eliminate the death penalty because it is unfairly arbitrary, as these two
counterpoised verdicts plainly show.
C. An Outgrowth of the Capital Jury Project
The implicit conclusion I find in Professor Sundby's book is unsurprising,
when one considers that the book is one product of an immense empirical study
known as the Capital Jury Project (CJP), whose anti-death penalty perspective is
well-known. The goal of the CJP is to interview jurors who have served in capital
cases and reached verdicts, gather lots of first-hand data about their deliberations,
and then examine that data to see what it reveals about how capital juries reach
their decisions and whether, and how, such juries follow the legal guides
established by the United States Supreme Court for death cases. 10 Headed by
Professor William Bowers of Northeastern University, and funded in part by the
National Science Foundation since 1991, the CJP has added immensely to our
understanding of how jurors and juries make decisions, as well as to many
important aspects of America's capital punishment regime." Almost 1,200 jurors
who have actually served in capital cases have been interviewed in depth, from
more than 353 capital trials in 14 states. 1
But although the CJP website describes CJP's mission as "seek[ing] to learn
whether jurors' exercise of capital sentencing discretion under modem capital
statutes conforms to constitutional standards, [and] whether these statutes have
remedied the arbitrariness ruled unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court in
Furman v. Georgia" (emphasis added),13 its answer has in fact been clear virtually
from the project's beginning: no. A 1995 article from Bowers initially reporting
the CJP's design and goals indicated ("preliminarily") that its findings about the
exercise of discretion by capital jurors "differ[s] from ... Supreme Court
precedent."' 14 More recently, Professor Bowers explained the CJP findings more
bluntly: "the capital punishment process is riddled with problems," and
10 Capital Jury Project, at http://www.cjp.neu.edu (last visited June 4, 2006).
11 Professor Sundby provides an Appendix listing 36 legal books or articles, including three
of his own, that have originated through the CJP. (Sundby, at 213-15.)
12 Capital Jury Project, supra note 10.
13 Id.
14 William J. Bowers, The Capital Jury Project: Rationale, Design, and Preview of Early
Findings, 70 IND. L.J. 1043, 1101 (1995).
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"constitutionally mandated requirements ... to eliminate arbitrary [capital]
sentencing are not working."' 5  "Surely," Professor Bowers confidently writes,
"this evidence of how capital jurors actually decide who must die will soon
convince our lawmakers that America's post-Furman experiment with capital
punishment has failed."' 6 Such progressive optimism echoes Justices Brennan's
and Marshall's famous-but also famously wrong-assertions about contemporary
values in Furman.17
D. The Arbitrariness Critique: An Attractive Red-Herring
Scott Sundby has long been one of the CJP's capital juror interviewers, and
his impressive scholarship in this area 8 makes clear that he shares many of
Bowers' views. And surely, if the goal of consistent jury results were
constitutionally mandated, the critique of capital punishment from seemingly
"arbitrary," or at least inconsistent, decisions would be irresistible.
However, Bowers and the CJP go far too far when they claim that the
Supreme Court ruled in Furman that "the arbitrariness of capital sentencing
rendered all existing capital statutes unconstitutional."' 9 In fact, Furman declared
only (only!) that the unguided processes for jury deliberations in capital cases at
the time were unconstitutional, not the arbitrariness of their results. 20 To be sure,
the arbitrariness of results was disturbing, as Justice Stewart so succinctly captured
in his as arbitrary as "being struck by lightning" critique. 2' But as even Bowers
notes, we have known empirically for at least half a century that jury trial results
can be inconsistent. Kalven & Ziesel's famous 1966 study of The American Jury
15 William J. Bowers & Wanda D. Foglia, Still Singularly Agonizing: Law's Failure to Purge
Arbitrariness from Capital Sentencing, 49 CRIM. L. BULL 51, 84 (2003).
16 Id. at 86.
17 See Furman, 408 U.S. at 299-300, 305 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("rejection [of the death
penalty] by contemporary society is virtually total"); accord id. at 360, 369 (Marshall, J., concurring)
("the death penalty is amorally unacceptable to the people of the United States at this time in their
history" and "the average citizen would, in my opinion, find it shocking to his conscience and sense
ofjustice"). Of course, within four years of Furman, thirty-six jurisdictions had legislated new death
penalty statutes. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 179-80 (opinion of Stewart, Powell, & Stevens, JJ.).
18 Scott E. Sundby, The Capital Jury and Empathy: The Problem of Worthy and Unworthy
Victims, 88 CORNELL L. REv. 343 (2003) [hereinafter Sundby, The Capital Jury and Empathy]; Scott
E. Sundby, The Interaction of Trial Strategy, Remorse, and the Death Penalty, 83 CORNELL L. REv.
1557 (1997); Scott E. Sundby, The Jury as Critic: An Empirical Look at How Capital Juries Perceive
Expert and Lay Testimony, 83 VA. L. REv. 1109 (1997).
19 Bowers & Foglia, supra note 15, at 51.
20 See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303 (1976) ("Furman's basic requirement
[was]... to guide, regularize, and make rationally reviewable the process for imposing a sentence of
death") (emphasis supplied).
21 Furman, 408 U.S. at 309 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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explained this clearly.22 Indeed, it has always been so: "[a]t least since the
Revolution, American jurors have, with some regularity, disregarded their oaths
and refused to convict defendants where a death sentence was the automatic
consequence of a guilty verdict., 23 In sum, inconsistent criminal jury results have
long been recognized and have never presented a constitutional objection.24
Moreover, it would seem impossible for it to be any other way. Jurors are
human beings, and human beings are notoriously inconsistent and unpredictable.
As Professor Sundby notes, apparently without concern, "individual jurors can
react differently to the very same evidence" and, consequently, "the very nature of
any one jury's deliberations will be unique." (Sundby, at 133, 134.) Thus it
cannot be a surprise that juries may differ in results. To put it bluntly, therefore,
America's constitutional enshrinement of the criminal jury trial is a constitutional
acceptance of "arbitrary" (if arbitrary means seemingly inconsistent) jury verdict
results. This is true throughout the American justice system: civil, criminal, felony
or misdemeanor. Capital jury verdicts are no exception. Indeed, what would be
surprising is if it were otherwise.
In fact, it is the opportunity for arbitrariness-that is, treating similar cases
differently-that constitutionally supports the requirement that juries must have
discretion to choose life in all capital cases.2 5 After Furman, one State reaction
was to eliminate juror discretion entirely, and return to the common-law fashion of
imposing death mandatorially upon conviction of a capital offense.2 6 In Woodson
22 E.g., KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 1, at 8, 496 ("only a very uneven and unequal
administration of justice can result from reliance on the jury;" "no two juries are alike"). Bowers
notes that Kalven and Zeisel "found substantial evidence of arbitrariness in the sentencing of capital
juries" in the very first sentence of his article. Bowers & Foglia, supra note 15, at 51.
23 Woodson, 428 U.S. at 293.
24 See United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57 (1984) (so holding).
25 The opportunity for arbitrariness is also, by the way, what allows most lawyers to make a
living. It is, in fact, an opportunity for which most private attorneys secretly hunger (but would never
admit to the public). That is, lawyers who want leniency, in any forum, for their client, want an
opportunity for arbitrariness, if what that means is non-uniform results. Lawyers seeking lenience
always want to argue that their particular case is "different" from all others, and occasionally
persuade a judge--or jury-that this is so, even when objective observers would uniformly disagree.
That is, lawyers want an opportunity for arbitrariness-so long as their case is on their preferred (i.e.,
the "right") side of the malleable dividing line.
Criminal defense lawyers in particular want an opportunity to influence the results of their
cases in ways that are non-uniform, or in other words, "arbitrary." For example, this has long been
the defense critique of the federal sentencing guidelines: by attempting to regularize the results in all
"like" cases and thereby eliminate "unwarranted disparity," the Guidelines have (goes the critique)
reduced judges to inhumane number-crunching computers and sentencings to emotionless,
unindividualized (in)justice events. They have eliminated the opportunity for "creative" defense
advocacy-meaning, the opportunity to persuade the judge to impose an inconsistently lenient result.
In short, what criminal defense lawyers want is the opportunity to create non-uniform, "arbitrary,"
results. This descriptive account seems not to be a criticism in the general sentencing context. How
interesting that it is, however, when capital sentencing is discussed.
26 Little, History, supra note 3, at 375.
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v. North Carolina (one of the companion cases to the Gregg trio that sustained the
constitutionality of "guided" juror discretion capital statutes), the Court ruled that
"evolving standards of decency" under the Eighth Amendment required that
mandatory death penalties be disallowed. Capital jurors must have "the possibility
of compassionate or mitigating factors stemming from the diverse frailties of
mankind. 27 The "uniquely individual" characteristics of every capital defendant,
his28 "character and propensities, 29 must be given to the jury so that they might
decide to impose life rather than death. Thus the potential for jury results that
might be viewed, by outside trial observers or summarizing generalizers, as
"inconsistent," is actually constitutionally required in the capital context. While
we might wish for perfect consistency (and yet we would also have to
acknowledge the impossibility of its achievement), there is simply no requirement,
constitutional or otherwise, for consistent capital verdicts. Moreover, unless we
want to risk the "level up" remedy that seems likely, 30 we ought not even desire it.
E. The Critique ofArbitrariness can Disappear upon Closer Examination
When viewed in the light of allowing jury discretion in order to permit
leniency, even the specific results in the Lane and Brown cases detailed in Life and
Death can readily be seen as far less "arbitrary" than the book suggests. Lane shot
a store clerk in cold blood, and the security videotape of the killing showed no
particular emotion or other explanatory evidence. Lane showed no remorse at trial,
and Lane's background showed no particular reason to feel sympathy sufficient to
overcome the jury's revulsion at his senseless murder of an innocent father of two
toddlers. (Sundby, at 1.) Brown presented a very different, and far more
sympathetic, picture to his jury. Unsurprisingly, the Brown jurors all reported
complete loathing for his horrific crime, and an initial inclination to sentence him
to death. But in the course of his sentencing hearing, Brown demonstrated to the
jury that he also had suffered an equally horrific childhood. He also presented
convincing testimony that he would pose no danger if imprisoned for life.
(Sundby, at 142-47.)
Thus the Brown and Lane cases were not, in fact, the same. While Brown's
crime was worse, his character was not.3 1 Undoubtedly, however, capital
27 Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304.
28 The pronoun "his" is used here because almost everyone on death row in the United States
is male. See U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STANDARDS, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
STATISTICS, available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/cp.htm (last visited June 5, 2006) (of 3,314
persons on U.S. death rows in 2004, only 52 were women, and of 60 executions, one was of a
woman). Shall we ask whether this reflects gender bias, and if so, do we wish to see it remedied?
29 Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304.
30 See RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME AND THE LAw 334, 341-45, 385-86 (1997).
31 Moreover, although Professor Sundby is notably silent about this, see infra at pp. 248-249,
Lane's lawyers did an obviously much worse job on the capital aspects of the case than did Brown's.
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sentencing requires evaluation on both these axes. So the differing results are not
"arbitrary," but rather explicable based on salient differences (in law school
parlance, the two cases were "distinguishable"). When one charitably reviews the
details of the two cases, the arbitrariness critique seems far weaker than the book
implicitly claims.
II. TALE OF Two JURIES (A SUMMARY OF THE BOOK)
A more detailed summary of Life and Death is, I think, useful at this point.
Life and Death primarily presents the "inside story" of one jury's deliberations in a
death penalty case, and details how the jury finally arrived at a unanimous decision
for death. It then briefly compares the Lane case to another (People v. Brown), in
which the offense facts were seemingly more egregious yet the jury eventually
voted for life. The book then concludes with a number of intelligent suggestions
for changes in the capital jury process, and some thoughtful consideration of "the
policy questions ... raised by the jurors' stories." (Sundby, at 186.)
It is in this last chapter that, I think, Professor Sundby's committed opposition
to the death penalty unavoidably seeps in, and it is only here, in his repeated (if
implicit) calls for "consistency" in death penalty jury verdicts, that I would suggest
a mild criticism. Professor Sundby writes that he "tried to keep [his] personal
views about capital punishment out of the telling of the jurors' stories" (Sundby, at
1), and he does a remarkably fair job of this. Yet it seems fairly obvious by the
book's end that this is an anti-death penalty book. The same jury stories told by a
capital punishment defender would likely have a different "spin" at some points.
This is merely a descriptive point for my review, however, surely not enough to
form a strong criticism. Sundby's efforts to stay "neutral" are probably as
effective as can possibly be achieved in this highly charged area.
A. People v. Lane
Stephen Lane committed a "generic" (Sundby, at 5) convenience store
robbery-murder. He was dumb enough to do it while a security camera captured
his acts on tape, thus leaving "not a shred of doubt about [his] guilt" for the killing.
(Sundby, at 8.) Despite this undisputable evidence, though, Lane presented a
defense of mistaken identity at the guilt-innocence stage. This surely must have
insulted the jury. And as Professor Sundby explains, such guilt-innocence
impressions inevitably infect later penalty-stage deliberations.
Moreover, despite the fact that the videotape showed an inexplicably fast
shooting ("Lane... uttered 'Open the till' and then pulled the trigger, shooting the
clerk at point-blank range," (Sundby, at 7-8)), the defense apparently never even
suggested an accidental, or at least unpremeditated-and thereby non-death-
eligible-killing. Surely a competent lawyer would have at least suggested that
Lane's adrenaline-pumped trigger finger slipped.
244 [Vol 4:237
THE EYES OF THE BEHOLDERS
Then, in the sentencing stage, Lane exhibited no remorse for his cold-blooded
killing. Indeed, a lead juror described Lane as a " mean-looking guy, a scowler."
(Sundby, at 8.) Where was Lane's million-dollar--or even buck ninety-five-jury
consultant? More relevantly, perhaps, where was Lane's constitutionally effective
lawyer?
Finally, little mitigating personal evidence was presented for Lane, while the
government presented Lane's numerous prior robbery convictions and evidence of
a post-offense prison escape plan of Lane's. These facts had not been known to
Lane's jury before, and had a "pyrotechnic effect" on their deliberations. (Sundby,
at 17.) The initial vote in the jury room was 9-3 for death, and after four days of
deliberation, the death verdict became unanimous.
B. Lane: Unspoken, but Clearly Ineffective, Counsel
Frankly, to me, even Professor Sundby's sympathetic description of Lane's
case simply screams out "ineffective assistance." Contesting identity despite the
videotape, no challenge to intent-to-kill, a lack of remorse, "mean-looking"
appearance and expressions, and little personal mitigation evidence? Come on!
The book does not reveal whether Lane has a habeas pending, and one wonders
whether the death verdict will stick. (Although as Professor Sundby points out, the
habeas and ineffective assistance standards are quite ungenerous to defendants, and
often a lawyer will be adjudged "effective" when s/he really did only "just enough
to get his client executed." (Sundby, at 137)).
Professor Sundby only tangentially adverts to the ineffectiveness critique in
Lane (mainly by showing how the fine job done by the lawyers in the Brown case
(Sundby, at 136-48) led to an improbable and, Sundby clearly suggests,
"inconsistent" (Sundby, at 79-185) life verdict). This seems intentional: he
cannot too harshly ascribe the Lane death verdict to ineffective assistance, or the
"inconsistency" he wishes to present with the later-described Brown LWOP (life
without parole) verdict will not seem as stark. One can argue that the soft-pedaling
of the ineffective assistance issues in Lane might be a case of putting one's point
(capital juries are disturbingly inconsistent) before one's fair judgment (Lane got
death due to ineffective assistance, not juror irrationality). Or perhaps Professor
Sundby wants to preserve Lane's habeas options and so avoids this issue. Or
perhaps, a more fair (smile) reviewer might suggest, Professor Sundby may have
so proceeded out of a commendable desire not to distract the reader while
presenting an unbiased view of the juror's stories. No matter: this is a small
objection and not likely apparent or important to many readers. The book
continues to fascinate once this point is passed.
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C. The Lane Jury Deliberations
After describing the Lane case, the bulk of the book provides a novelistic
account of how the jury reached its verdict, and overcame its initial divisions, over
the next four days. (Sundby, 1-132.) This aspect of the book is, quite simply,
fascinating-in part because most lawyers with interest in the criminal law will
never serve on a jury, let alone a capital jury, and in part because the writing is so
good and the human story is told so captivatingly. One imagines that Sundby's
best-selling novel will soon follow. Scott Turow, watch out.
Most dramatically, these chapters describe the emotional, wrenching two days
of deliberation that saw a lone female "holdout" juror ultimately vote for death-
only to later express remorse about her decision, too late to change the verdict.
Remember, these accounts are provided through the jurors' own words, gathered in
remarkable in-depth interviews. This is wonderful first-hand source material, not
usually found in appellate decisions that are the standard fare in law school classes.
Professor Sundby does a masterful job in weaving the jurors' words together with
his own observations. He also interweaves a deceptively "oh by the way"
presentation of the intricacies of capital punishment law. I really cannot make the
point strongly enough: stop reading this review, and go read the book.
Chapter one presents the Lane case and deliberations through the eyes of Ken,
"the Idealist" juror, who had little difficulty reaching a death verdict and played a
central role in developing "norms" that the Lane jury used to try to keep their
discussions calm and equal. (Sundby, at 13.)
Chapter two presents the story from "the Chorus," a group of five jurors
whose accounts were "remarkably similar," perhaps because they were all white
women with grown children. (Sundby, at 29.) (Tangentially, the Lane jury
appears to have been comprised of white jurors only. As Professor Sundby later
notes, this turns out to be an unexpectedly influential factor: a "groundbreaking
study" finds that "the seating of at least one male black juror [is] the key in
precipitating [a 35%] drop in the rate of death sentences." (Sundby, at 151, 203
n. 11. 2) Data showing undeniable effects of race on the capital punishment system
is consistent, persistent, and disturbing.33 Commendably, because the goal is to
present a short, readable book about capital juries, Professor Sundby does not
overburden his book with these studies. Yet he also does not ignore or undersell
the racial undertones that cast a shadow in virtually all capital cases.)
"The Chorus" is used to present many practical, as well as legal, concerns that
arise in capital cases:
32 Id. at 151, 203 (citing William J. Bowers et al., Death Sentencing in Black and White, 3 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 171 (2001)).
33 See Rory K. Little, What Federal Prosecutors Really Think: The Puzzle of Statistical Race
Disparity Versus Specific Guilt, and the Specter of Timothy McVeigh, 55 DEPAUL L. REv. 1591,
1591-96 (2004) [hereinafter Little, What Federal Prosecutors Really Think]; see also Little, History,
supra note 3, at 476-90; Little, Moratorium, supra note 4, at 807-10.
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e The unspoken messages that jurors can receive through the
defendant's appearance and non-verbal actions (for example, Lane
changing his appearance from arrest photos to the trial table, taken as an
effort to "deceive;" and a demeanor that seemed to show unrepentence).
* The backfiring danger of contesting guilt, only to later admit it at the
sentencing stage and ask for mercy.
e The silent fear of jurors that life in prison actually means release
someday. And the confidence of many jurors that a death penalty will,
realistically, never be carried out-in California, where the Lane case
was prosecuted, a confidence born of the reality that from 1977 through
2004, "only 10 of the 717 defendants sentenced to death... have been
executed." (Sundby, at 38.)
* The fact, revealed only through the Capital Jury Interviewing Project,
that when victims are randomly selected, jurors tend to view their killers
as "particularly menacing" and, surprisingly to some, often choose death
in such cases despite an absence of terribly gross killings. (Sundby, at
41.34)
* The fact that capital jurors (indeed, all jurors? all people?) are
"suspicious of mental health experts" and can view paid psychologists as
"hired guns" and "professional witnesses" in a pejorative sense.
(Sundby, at 44-45.)
* The confusing nature of jury instructions, in important cases where all
might agree that the instructions to jurors ought be absolutely as clear
and jargon-free as possible.
Finally, this chapter presents the "personal turmoil and exchanges frayed with
tension and anger" that ultimately led to a unanimous death verdict. The Chorus
jurors described the holdout juror as "mentally unbalanced" (Sundby, at 54) and
described all the non-legal tactics that they employed (including consciously
misinterpreting some of the instructions and suggesting that the holdout might lose
her job if deliberations continued longer) to convince the holdout to change her
vote. (Sundby, at 54.) Yet in the end, "they felt that justice had been achieved."
(Sundby, at 57.) Ultimately, the Chorus chapter presents a fascinating
psychological portrait of capital deliberations that is instructive to any lawyer who
prepares jury cases of any kind.
D. An Aside: Do Subtle Descriptions Betray Perspective?
As an aside, I think a few points in this chapter belie Professor Sundby's
professed allegiance to neutrality. By describing a "perception of Lane as a
34 Citing Sundby, The Capital Jury and Empathy, supra note 18, at 343.
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remorseless manipulator" that was "rapidly hardening," Professor Sundby subtly
suggests that this perception was perhaps inaccurate. (Sundby, at 42.) But my
reading is that it seems like a perfectly responsible perception for the jurors to have
developed, based on the totality of what they saw and heard. Similarly, the jurors'
idea that Lane would probably never be put to death, but that placing him on death
row would subject him to the worst possible prison conditions, seems neither
irrational nor criticizable, as I think Professor Sundby subtly suggests. (Sundby, at
39.)
Similarly, Professor Sundby notes that the Chorus jurors viewed the Holdout
juror as "irrational," but he describes it as "what they saw as" irrational. (Sundby,
at 53.) This is a small and subtle, but I think revealing, phrase. The idea that a
holdout juror in a capital case might actually be irrational or unbalanced, seems not
to be capable of objective identification in an anti-death penalty worldview. If you
are against capital punishment, holding out for life simply cannot be irrational.
Finally, Sundby explains that Lane's lawyers "had to create a case for life" by
"present[ing]" a "story" that would show that "the tragedy that ensued was but the
final act of a series of life events that had hurtled [Lane] into a downward spiral
beyond his control." (Sundby, at 43.) Now that is a well-written screenplay, and
no doubt Lane would have done better with Sundby as the director. But perhaps
such a "story" was unavailable because it was factually not true. Even more
wonderingly, perhaps it would not be appropriate for honest lawyers to offer it, if
not true, in a justice system. That is, perhaps only an absolutist opponent of capital
punishment can believe that such a mitigating "story" is available in every capital
case. Or in other words, perhaps some killers-perhaps even Lane-actually
deserve to die for their crimes. (Timothy McVeigh is undoubtedly a "poster child"
for this view.35) Perhaps there simply is no mitigating "story" that should defuse
the capital case for some killers. While Professor Sundby aspires mightily to
present an evenhanded capital punishment account, a subconscious disbelief that
such a world-view can reasonably exist-that is, that there can be a reasonable,
morally acceptable pro-death penalty view-subtly infuses even this admirable
attempt.
E. The Holdout Juror
But back to our story. Chapter three presents the story of "The Holdout"
juror, Peggy. I do not think it is a coincidence that this is the longest chapter, by
some 50%, in the book. The Holdou?6 is presented not as an irrational,
35 See Little, What Federal Prosecutors Really Think, supra note 33, at 1604.
36 Professor Sundby begins this chapter by describing a 1959 Norman Rockwell magazine
cover entitled The Holdout, which depicted a lone female juror coolly refusing to give in to the other,
all-male jurors. In addition to my other praises for his work, the breadth and depth of Professor
Sundby's research is evident and impressive. Yet this also subtly romanticizes the anti-death penalty
view. To my knowledge, Rockwell never suggested that his "holdout" was a capital juror.
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emotionally unbalanced person, but as an heroic Jimmy Stewart-ish figure who
tried epically to withstand the force of the somehow unthinking or overbearing
pro-death jurors. (At one point, Sundby conversely describes the pro-death jurors,
pejoratively if unconsciously, as acting like "devoutly religious individuals
proselytizing." (Sundby, at 52.) But no facts about the pro-death jurors' actual
religious beliefs are in fact offered. It is unspoken, and unfortunate, that the
"intelligentsia" that oppose capital punishment also often hold the religiously
devout in quiet contempt). Peggy is not actually unbalanced, but rather exhibits a
"strength of conviction" that "one could not help but admire." (Sundby, at 106.)
But respectfully, this seems true only if "one" is staunchly against the death
penalty. The depiction of the Holdout juror, and of Lane, is quite sympathetic.
Death penalty lawyers would do well to examine it closely, in the effort to
persuade (or prevent) a juror to (1) hold out, and (2) stay true and not switch her
vote. Moreover, if Lane's actual lawyers could have created more generally the
impression about Lane that the holdout developed, and which Professor Sundby so
articulately describes, then a different verdict might have resulted (again this raises
the undiscussed ineffective assistance claim).
Professor Sundby also attributes to the jury a misunderstanding of the jury
instructions, an erroneous belief that if the jury rendered a "hung" verdict, then
Lane would automatically receive a life sentence. I think he is wrong in this.
While it seems true from Sundby's account that the other jurors described it this
way to the Holdout, it seems inaccurate to say that "no one realized" that this was
erroneous. (Sundby, at 56, 90.) A hung verdict meant simply that a new
sentencing hearing would be held (i.e., that a death verdict would not be precluded
by a hung jury). My reading of the deliberations is that the pro-death jurors fully
understood this. It seems that they intentionally misdescribed an "automatic life
sentence" view to the holdout juror as a tactic to get her to vote for death. As
Professor Sundby quotes one of the Chorus, "We made an interpretation on this
because we were dealing with Peggy ... and we were trying to force the issue."
(Sundby, at 55-56, emphasis added.) Now, the difference here could be important
only to a habeas court attempting to decide if the jury was operating under a
material confusion. My reading is that they were not (except possibly for the
Holdout); Professor Sundby seems here to be trying to preserve Lane's habeas
options.
In any case, the last eight pages of the Holdout chapter are devoted to
describing Peggy's change of heart about her vote, and her efforts to deal with that
psychologically as well as legally. We are left with lingering, or even stronger,
doubts about the fairness, as well as the legal validity, of Lane's death sentence.
The final chapter describing the Lane case is "The Twelfth Juror," a brief
depiction of a "rough" juror with "brief... predictable" answers to explain why he
had firmly voted for death, and who was "blunt and challenging" in attempting to
persuade the Holdout to his position. Now, these descriptors may be accurate. But
their pejorative cast might also suggest a somewhat unbalanced view of the pro
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and anti-death jurors in the Lane case. Holdout jurors are thoughtful and
courageous, while firmly pro-death jurors are blunt, rough, and unsophisticated.
Sundby even describes the latter "type" ofjuror as a "fundamentalist" for believing
"that certain types of murder morally require a sentence of death." (Sundby, at
125.) While this does not appear to be a conscious attempt to invoke prejudices
that exist against religious "fundamentalists," the implication is, it seems to me,
unavoidable.
The "fundamentalist" label seems unnecessarily, although again perhaps not
consciously, pejorative and revealing of an anti-death penalty perspective. I will
unempirically submit that, in fact, many Americans share a moral view that
"you're responsible for your actions" and have a "fundamental" belief in taking
personal responsibility for one's choices. (Sundby, at 114.) Rather than describe
such views in a belittling manner, as though no sophisticated member of the
intelligentsia could possibly hold such a view, American opponents of capital
punishment would do better, I think, to accept that intelligent, caring people can
hold such views, and even show respect for them. In a society which consistently
shows roughly two-thirds or more support for capital punishment, caricaturing the
views of the majority as simply blunt and unsophisticated will do nothing but drive
the camps further apart. Sundby closes this part of his book describing Peggy as
needing to "explain" that Lane's case "had gone terribly awry," as though its awry-
ness were a fact. (Sundby, at 131.) It is a small, semantic matter, but another
view might be that while Peggy might need to try to "convince" others that the
case had gone awry, it actually had not.
F. The Brown Case
Professor Sundby then briefly, in one chapter, presents a capital case to
contrast to Lane. The Brown case presented horrific killings, preceded by torture
and rape, of two young male victims, described by one juror as "the most horrible,
gruesome things you can ever imagine one human being doing to another."
(Sundby, at 138.) And yet the jury returned an LWOP, no-death, verdict. The
unasked question fairly bums while hanging in the air: how can this be? How can
this be fair?
G. The Last Three Chapters
The last three chapters of Professor Sundby's wonderful, if not entirely
neutral, book are chock-full of perceptive thoughts and analysis, as well as smart
and practical suggestions for improving the capital system. I will not belabor this
review with more detail. But again: any capital lawyer, judge, or legislator should
read this book. It is realistic and it is cutting-edge, in terms of what individual
defense lawyers, as well as systemic policy-makers, can do.
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III. CONSISTENCY AND JUSTICE: NOT THE SAME, NOT EVEN NECESSARILY
COMPLIMENTARY
In his final chapter, Professor Sundby repeatedly presents the idea that capital
cases verdicts should be "consistent" in order to be fair: "A series of randomly
chosen juries should consistently reach the same factual conclusion when looking
at the same evidence, just as randomly chosen math students should always agree
that four times four equals sixteen." (Sundby, at 183.) Putting aside my jealousy
that Sundby's children are plainly better at math than mine-as well as Justice
Holmes' concern for legal hobgoblins-I will accept this assertion for the
moment.37 If consistency is the goal, or the standard by which the desirability of
capital punishment should be judged, then how can the Lane death sentence
possibly survive next to Brown's life sentence?
In fact, I think this is Professor Sundby's overarching point: a system that
produces life for Brown and yet death for Lane is unjust, and should be abandoned.
And the point is all the more powerful for being unstated: the book never directly
proclaims such a blunt view. Rather, the intelligent reader necessarily must come
to it simply by the unvarnished force of neutral description.
However, as described above, I think Professor Sundby's account actually
provides a variety of reasons to respect the jurors' decision in both of these cases,
and to understand the difference in results, even if one does not agree with them.
The Brown and Lane cases are in fact quite different, significantly so, and provide
no fair ground for an inconsistency argument.
Moreover, it would seem quite reasonable to argue that if any jury got it
"wrong," it was the Brown jury, and that in fact both Brown and Lane could
reasonably be said to deserve death penalties. In stating this idea, I come to what I
thought was a most revealing paragraph at the end of the book. Professor Sundby
presents three possibilities (Sundby, at 179-80): perhaps "some might believe" that
Lane ought not receive death, if Brown gets life. Or perhaps some would accept
the two differing verdicts as reasonable based on the significant differences in the
defendants' mitigation cases. Or (finally), perhaps "some" would argue that
neither Lane nor Brown should receive death.
Do you see the possibility that is missing? The fourth alternative view that,
seemingly, has not found its way to consciousness in this ultimately anti-death
penalty book? Of course it is the view, which some "fundamentalists" might hold,
that both Lane and Brown should have received death penalties. It is something
like the "level up" reality that Professor Randy Kennedy confronts in his masterful
book Race, Crime and the Law.38 It is not only symmetrically, but also viscerally,
obvious in light of the facts of Brown's offense. And yet this fourth view does not
receive mention, let alone serious attention, in the closing pages of Life and Death.
37 But see supra text accompanying notes 19-30.
38 KENNEDY, supra note 30.
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I think the failure to perceive it as a realistic view is symptomatic of the anti-death
penalty camp. Until the fourth view is acknowledged and understood, foes of
capital punishment still have a long American distance to travel.
IV. CONCLUSION
In the end, one's view of capital juries is-and is this too obvious a point?-
unavoidably colored by one's views about capital punishment. Thus it is no
criticism to suggest that Professor Sundby does not remain dispassionately neutral;
such dispassion is neither possible, nor perhaps even to be desired, on one of the
largest moral questions in American law. The story of juries that appear to reach
"inconsistent" verdicts is not a new one, nor is it limited to the death penalty
context. Moreover, a dramatic presentation that different juries can reach
markedly different verdicts-life versus death-in cases that are presented as
meriting the opposite results, is not really an argument against the death penalty. It
is, instead, an argument against using juries. Yet Professor Sundby argues
convincingly, I think, that requiring juries of 12 for death penalty decisions is
normatively better than using solo judges. (Sundby, at 177-78.) I agree with him
in this, even if the Constitution did not mandate it (as I think it does).
Life and Death is about the death penalty as seen though the "eyes of its
beholders:" twelve average non-lawyer jurors, exposed to the stark issues of capital
punishment in the crucible of specific facts. But it is clear that the beauty of the
jury itself is also, as it were, in the eyes of its beholders: lawyers who oppose, or
support, the death penalty see the flexibility, or inherent arbitrariness, of the jury
system as a value or an ill.
In the end, the subjectivity of the capital punishment debate is simply a
reflection of the penalty itself. Strive as we may, "the community's moral sense of
... just punishment" will never be consistent. (Sundby, at 177-78.) But it may be
"just"--at least in individual cases. 39 Here, I think, Professor Sundby's critique
unconsciously fails. He describes a concept of "moral accuracy" as requiring
"consisten[cy] and fair[ness]." (Sundby, at 179, emphasis added.) But the two
concepts are hardly the same, and need not necessarily be co-joined. Thus, I think,
one is hard put to describe the verdict in either Brown or Lane as "unjust"-one
can merely claim they are somehow "unequal." But on such moral questions, the
carpenter's measure fails. Just (or "fair") results may not always seem
"consistent," when the level of abstraction is raised even one notch. In fact,
abstraction is sometimes the enemy of justice, at least in the eyes of non-lawyers.
Many non-lawyers do not seek consistency across categories, so much as justice in
individual cases. They do not see the two concepts as one, and are not offended by
"inconsistency" of just results. People, like law professors, can always distinguish
39 That jury results may be inconsistent and yet also just is hardly a new idea. See, e.g.,
Alexander M. Bickel, Comment, Judge and Jury--Inconsistent Verdicts in the Federal Courts, 63
HARV. L. REV. 649, 653 n.22 (1950).
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similar cases; but injustice is not so easily dismissed. Thus, I think Justice Holmes
was (as usual) correct, if too aphoristic, about consistency being a hobgoblin for
lawyers. It often is not, for the average American.
"Average" non-lawyer Americans, however, are the "beholders" that count, as
jurors determining death penalties and as voters determining America's societal
policies. Our judicial system is not about to take capital legislation off the table by
constitutional fiat-even Furman's mild experiment in that direction failed,
dramatically so in terms of speed and numbers. Thus the need to describe death
penalty results as unjust, as well as unequal, is a powerful if subjective point, one
that the capital punishment debate must acknowledge or it will never capture the
heart of the average non-lawyer citizen who, in our democracy, controls the
relevant legal processes. Professor Sundby's admirable volume takes us closer to
"lay" understanding here. While it does not close the gap--and the gap may not be
closeable, for those of us forever warped by three years of law school-it takes us
further, with less deadening detail and more entertainment,4 ° than any similar
volume in the field. Critique is easy, writing is hard. Scott Sundby has done
admirable heavy lifting here.
40 An entire section of this review probably should be devoted to the quick and subtle humor
that also pops up throughout this wonderful book. It cannot be easy to write with humor about capital
punishment. Few could pull it off without offending. But Professor Sundby does so with grace, so
that his treatment of serious issues is furthered by softening them, if you will, with genuine smiles.
Thus: "The phrase 'death eligible' sounds as if the defendant has won something ("Mr. Lane, you are
now death eligible.... ")." (Sundby, at 9.) Or, "[in a case that will give heart to English teachers
everywhere, a juror who taught high school English played a key role throughout the deliberations in
clarifying definitions of words like 'heinous."' (Sundby, at 119.)
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